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What explains the relative levels of riches across countries? Building on the approach used
in Klenow and Rodr guez-Clare (1997) and Hall and Jones (1999), Jones (2008) oers a re-
cent account attributing the bulk of observed income-per-capita dierences among countries
to \TFP", or Total-Factor-Productivity, i.e., essentially to residually measured productivity
dierences. TFP dierences are residual in that they capture the productivity dierences
that remain after dierences in physical and human capital (per capita, or per worker) have
been measured and taken into account, using the assumption of an aggregate Cobb-Douglas
production function. Thus, under the assumptions maintained in these accounting analyses,
to understand dierences in income across countries it is not sucient to understand dier-
ences in rates of accumulation of physical or human capital, at least if the available measures
of physical and human capital are accurate. Therefore, much of the growth theory that an-
alyzes such accumulation may \miss the point", if the purpose is to explain relative income
dierences across countries quantitatively. In conclusion, it seems reasonable to concur with
the way Prescott (1998) puts it: \Needed: A Theory of Total Factor Productivity". The
present paper proposes one direction in which theories with this aim might be built.
We also take the point of view that a theory of the world distribution of TFP should,
ideally, display two features. One is that long-run world TFP growth is endogenous, i.e.,
\nontrivially" determined within the model. Thus, in this sense we very much take the
view of the endogenous growth literature (Romer (1986), Lucas (1988), Rebelo, (1991), and
others). Whether the long-run world growth rate (or perhaps just the level increments) is
endogenous is perhaps not central; for simplicity here though, we assume that it is. The
second feature that we view as essential is that whereas each given country can inuence its
relative TFP level, it can do little to inuence its own long-run rate of TFP growth. More
precisely, we view countries as small and their long-run growth rates as determined by the
rate at which \world TFP" (i.e., some average, or perhaps the frontier) grows. This view
is partly based on there only having been rather minor increases in the dispersion among
countries during the period over which there is reliable country income data (essentially,
Heston, Summers and Aten (2006)). In addition, modern economies are arguably (i) highly
dependent on world technological developments, as evidenced by, among others, Benhabib
and Spiegel (1994), who nd productivity catch-up to be statistically signicant for growth of
TFP; and (ii) open in the sense that even if conventional trade is not entirely free, technology
spillovers ow rather freely across countries in the world. In sum, we view the world average
growth rate as endogenous but, conditional on this rate, any individual country's growth
rate as exogenous.
Given this perspective, we construct a theory of the world TFP distribution that has at
its core the specication of technology advancement proposed in Nelson and Phelps (1966).
They hypothesized a form of technology, or human-capital, catch-up: in a country context,
the growth rate of technology, or human capital, in a given country can be increased if
this country invests, and the further is the distance from the technology frontier, the more
2productive is such an investment. That is, if a country is further behind, the potential
for rapid growth is higher, since the country can \free-ride" on technologies/human capital
accumulated elsewhere. A Nelson-Phelps view of development is indeed taken explicitly in
Jones's (1998) textbook on economic growth: he embeds the Nelson-Phelps formulation into
a developing-country growth model, and uses it as a framework for productivity accounting
and growth dynamics. In this paper we thus take the Nelson-Phelps-Jones perspective on
development but then go on to ask a further question: if countries are subject to this \tech-
nology for productivity growth", and each country operates the technology optimally from
the viewpoint of maximizing the utility of its citizens, what is the implied equilibrium world
distribution of country TFP? Since the catch-up term by denition means that countries
benet from spillovers, there is an obvious force for convergence, but how does this force
play out in equilibrium?
Our main ndings can be described as follows. Although convergence forces are always
present in the model, if the catch-up term is weak enough, the stable long-run world distri-
bution of TFP is not single-peaked but bimodal. There is one group of countries with high
TFP in relative terms, with the remainder of the countries operating at a much lower TFP
level. All countries grow at the same rate, but the high-TFP countries invest more in tech-
nology than do low-TFP countries. The catch-up term thus allows the low-TFP countries to
grow at the same rate and not fall further behind in relative terms. The bimodality is rst
derived using a model without idiosyncratic (country-specic) TFP shocks, and with this
setting bimodality means that the long-run TFP distributions have two (and exactly two)
groups of countries, within each of which all countries have the same TFP level. In the model
with shocks, in contrast, there is a \smooth" long-run distribution, and this distribution can
have two visible peaks or just one. However, even when there is a single peak in the TFP
distribution, and where the corresponding long-run, no-shocks outcome has a single group
of countries with identical TFP, the distribution can have signicant dispersion around the
mode. Thus, the theory embodies strong forces pulling countries apart.
Formally, in our model, individual countries can invest in a technology-enhancing input,
e, in order to increase their TFP, T. We think of this investment input as a traded one
(such as educated workers), which can thus be allocated across countries, and there will
be an equilibrium world price for this input. The accumulation of TFP, as mentioned, is
of the Nelson-Phelps (1966) form: TFP growth in a given country depends positively on
investment in TFP and, in addition, on the country's distance to the world technology





where i is a country index and t stands for time;  T is world average (or frontier) TFP, and the
function H, which is increasing, describes how e units translate into TFP growth units. In
the model, all countries are symmetric; they have identical technologies and only potentially
dier by their initial conditions. The distribution of countries over TFP levels is determined
by two counteracting forces. First, the technological catch-up of less developed countries
generates convergence. Second, the internalization of country-specic dynamic gains from
TFP investment generates divergence. Thus, in terms of this specication, we nd that the
3distribution of TFP can be bimodal, provided that the weight on the catch-up factor in the
Nelson-Phelps equation, , is suciently close to zero.
The intuition why catch-up is a force for convergence is straightforward. Why, though,
is there a force for divergence if  is small? Consider the extreme case, i.e.,  = 0. Here,
we can write the TFP technology as Ti;t+1 = Ti;tH(ei;t), and it is clear that, as a dynamic
technology for accumulation, the system has increasing returns to scale, as long as H is
increasing: if Ti;t and ei;t both double, Ti;t+1 more than doubles, or doubles exactly if H
is at. Thus, when individual country planners operate technologies of this sort, there are
dynamic increasing returns to scale, and thus internalizing these gains is important and
leads to a force for divergence: those countries with initially (or, by idiosyncratic stochastic
events) high Ti levels have an advantage in further growth.
How can our ndings be used to interpret the available country data? Aside from pro-
viding a theory of relative TFPs in the world (and a potential for bimodality), we use the
theory to speculate on the ndings in Acemoglu (2009). He plots a sequence of distributions
of countries according to GDP per worker, for 1960, 1980, and 2000, and it reveals some visi-
ble changes in the shape of the distribution and, in particular, in the \degree of bimodality".
Thus, the 1980 and 2000 distributions are \more bimodal" than is the 1960 distribution. In
terms of the model, a move toward bimodality can for example be due to (i) a decrease in
eective spillovers (a lower ); (ii) a decrease in the cost of trading e; (iii) increases in the
extent to which e aects TFP (a change in the shape of H); or (iv) transitional dynamics.
We interpret and compare these channels in Section 8 of the paper.
Our present setting is not designed as a full-edged quantitative assessment of the kind of
theory we propose; among other things, we abstract from capital accumulation (thus, TFP
and labor productivity are synonymous). Perhaps more importantly, a serious quantitative
model of world TFP would require more geographic detail than our setting with (ex-ante)
identical countries, since we envisage the critical distinction here|between which TFP in-
vestments are internalized and which are not|to coincide with country borders. Thus, for
example,  should in principle be determined based on how large countries are, and it would
arguably also be more appropriate with a model which has heterogeneity in  across coun-
tries. Such an extension, and a full quantitative investigation, would be an interesting one to
pursue. Thus, our present analysis is to be interpreted as a rst pass at how \rational TFP
accumulation decisions on the country level", in combination with technology spillovers as
proposed by Nelson-Phelps, deliver a model of relative riches in the world.
The paper is organized as follows. The related literature is presented in Section 2. Section
3 describes the model. The balanced growth equilibrium of the model is dened in Section
4. Section 5 describes the symmetric balanced growth equilibrium, and analyses its stability.
Asymmetric balanced growth equilibria and their stability properties are characterized in
Section 6. In Section 7, the model is extended to allow for country-specic shocks to TFP.
Section 8 entails an analysis of what model parameters might change the distribution of
relative TFPs over time, and Section 9 concludes.
42 Related literature
In an inuential article, Nelson and Phelps (1966) argued that in an economy with technolog-
ical change, the more educated the workforce is, the faster new technologies of production will
be introduced. The argument was formalized in a model where advancement of technology
depends positively upon investment in education and upon the gap between the best-practice,
or frontier, technology and the technology currently used. Parente and Prescott (1994) in-
corporate a similar mechanism into a model of an economy featuring rms, households, and
a government. They propose that dierences in barriers to technology adoption can account
for the observed income disparities across countries. In the model, a rm can invest in
adoption of more productive technologies, and the amount of investment needed depends on
the barriers to technology adoption in the country where it operates. Parente and Prescott
calibrate the model and argue that the dierences in barriers required to account for the
observed cross-country income dierences are not implausibly large. Similarly, Jones (1998)
endogenizes technology diusion in the Romer model, by introducing the model proposed by
Nelson and Phelps. He assumes that a country's human capital or skill accumulation depends
on investment in education as well as technological spillover from the technology frontier.
While Parente and Prescott (1994) and Jones (1998) introduce the Nelson-Phelps framework
into growth models, both explore the implications for income levels and growth rates in a
partial equilibrium setting. In this paper, we extend the analysis to general equilibrium.
Large dierences in per capita income across countries as well as a \twin-peaked "dis-
tribution of world income has been documented by for example Quah (1993), Quah (1997),
and Kremer, Onatski, and Stock (2001). Several economists have constructed models aimed
at explaining these empirical ndings. An example is Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1997)
which uses a neoclassical growth model to determine how much of the variation in incomes
across countries that can be explained by distortions to capital accumulation. The distortions
are modeled as a stochastic process for the price of investment relative to consumption. Sim-
ilarly, Acemoglu and Ventura (2002) explain the world income distribution by accumulation
of capital in combination with international trade and specialization. However, technology,
rather than physical or human capital, appears to be the main determinant of the dierences
in incomes. For example, Klenow and Rodr guez-Clare (1997) nd that about 50 percent
of cross-country variation in GDP per worker is explained by dierences in productivity.
Similarly, Jones (2008) nds that approximately one-third of dierences in income across
countries can be explained by dierences in capital per person, while dierences in TFP
explain the remaining two-thirds. Therefore, along with Parente and Prescott (1994), a
number of models have been developed to explain income dierences by modeling dierences
in productivity rather than in accumulation of capital.
Several models constructed to explain the dierences in income across countries have
used the Schumpeterian growth model as a point of departure. For example, Howitt (2000)
analyzes a multi-country version of the Aghion-Howitt endogenous growth model with tech-
nology transfer across countries. Under the assumption that the countries dier in their R&D
5productivities, R&D subsidy rates, or investment rates, the model can generate \club conver-
gence", whereby countries which invest in R&D will converge to parallel growth paths, and
countries which do not will stagnate. Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) use a similar model
with technology transfer across countries. However, the extent to which a country benets
from technology transfer depends on its \absorptive capacity". In that model, countries sort
into three convergence groups characterized by R&D, implementation and stagnation, re-
spectively. Aghion, Howitt and Mayer-Foulkes (2005) introduce credit market imperfections
in the multi-country Schumpeterian model. The model exhibits technology transfer, where
an investment in R&D is a prerequisite for the receiving country to benet from the transfer.
It is assumed that R&D requires access to external nance, at a cost which depends on the
level of nancial development. The model predicts that countries above a certain threshold of
nancial development will converge to a high growth rate, whereas other countries converge
to strictly lower growth rates. Lucas (2000), nally, also analyzes a model of world income
based on technology diusion. He calibrates the model and nds that the predictions are
consistent with \club convergence" over the postwar period.
The present paper also models investments in productivity, but aside from taking an
explicit Nelson-Phelps view on technology diusion, it diers from the models described
above in two additional ways. First, rather than assuming that countries have dierent
characteristics, it treats all countries symmetrically. In addition, it models internalization of
the dynamic gains from productivity investments at a country level.
3 Model
The world consists of a continuum of countries indexed i. Each country produces output,
and invests in TFP accumulation in order to increase future output. The investment in TFP
can be R&D, technology adoption, improving institutions etc. Each country is endowed
with both low-skilled and high-skilled labor, where low-skilled labor is used in production
of output and high-skilled labor in the accumulation of TFP. The number of high-skilled
workers employed in country i at time t is denoted ei;t. It is assumed that low-skilled labor
is immobile while high-skilled labor ows freely across countries. The total amount of high-
skilled labor in the world is xed, and it is equal to eW. All countries are of the same
size. Country i's endowment of low-skilled labor is normalized to one, and its endowment of
high-skilled labor is equal to the world total (and average), eW.
Country i's income Yi;t is the output produced net of TFP investment costs:
Yi;t = Ti;t  1   wtei;t + wteW: (1)
In (1), Ti;t is country i0s level of TFP. Since the amount of low-skilled workers is normalized
to 1, it is also equal to country i0s output. wt is the world wage rate for high-skilled workers,
and the investment cost constitutes of wage payments to foreign high-skilled workers. This
formulation for income is admittedly simple, but it is a starting point for the analysis.
63.1 TFP accumulation
All countries have the same technology for TFP accumulation but possibly dierent starting
levels of TFP. In each country, the TFP investment is chosen by a country planner.
In the model by Nelson and Phelps (1966), advancement of technology depends posi-
tively upon investment in education and upon the gap between the best-practice, or frontier,
technology and the technology currently used. This paper follows their formulation, but
views the investment as a general investment in TFP, and allows the importance of techno-









where the distance to the world TFP frontier is captured by the term
 Tt
Ti;t, and  Tt is the
world average, or frontier, TFP level. Common access to the frontier TFP generates a faster
catch-up the further behind a country is. The parameter  2 [0;1] measures the strength
of the catch-up eect. The investment in TFP is captured by H(ei;t), the TFP production
function.
It is assumed that H(ei;t) is strictly increasing and strictly concave in ei;t. In addition, it
must satisfy the following conditions: H(0) = 1, H0(0) = 1, and H(ei;t) is bounded above
by b, where b is not too large. The following functional form for H(ei;t)







satises the conditions while being relatively simple, and this specication of H(ei;t) will be
used throughout the analysis.







The parameter   determines the extent to which  Tt depends on the leading, or frontier, TFP
level in the world. For   = 1,  Tt is the arithmetic average of all countries' TFP levels, and
for   = 1, it is equal to the highest TFP level. The world TFP level grows according to
 Tt+1 =  Tt(1 + gt)
where gt is endogenously determined.






7From this expression, it is clear that investments in TFP have dynamic eects, some of
which are specic to the country, as captured by the term Ti;t and others which are inter-
national, as captured by  Tt. The parameter  governs the share of these dynamic eects
which is country-specic. For example, if  = 1, dynamic gains of TFP investment arise
only through technological catch-up. If  = 0, dynamic gains of TFP investment are com-
pletely internalized within the country. The parameter  shows to be crucial for the model's
results, and will be discussed at length below. For comparison, Jones (1998) uses the same
formulation as (2) but views Ti;t as human capital and ei;t as education investment.
3.2 Consumers






where  is the discount factor. The consumer is endowed with 1 unit of low-skilled labor
and eW units of high-skilled labor.
3.3 Country planner problem
The aim of this paper is to explain the distribution of TFP across countries. Therefore, the
model focuses on inter-country relationships and is solved in general equilibrium, while intra-
country relationships are given a cursory representation. We do not consider the aggregation
of individual rms' TFP into country TFP in a given country, and output is specied only
at the country level, as given by the expression in (1). Hence, it is assumed that technol-
ogy ows freely within countries, and all dynamic eects are internalized within a country.
Therefore, we will characterize the country planner's solution of the individual country's
optimization problem. The country planner chooses a sequence of consumption allocations
and investments in TFP so as to maximize consumer utility, taking the sequence of world
























where pt is the time-0 price of the time t good and p0 = 1. The country planner maximizes
utility of consumption given two constraints. The rst is the resource constraint, and the
second governs the accumulation of TFP. Since each country is assumed to be small, its TFP
8choice has no eect on the average TFP level and therefore the country planner takes  Tt as
given.
3.4 World equilibrium
A world equilibrium consists of sequences of allocations fTi;t;Ci;t;ei;tg
1






t=0 solves the problem in (6) for all i;






for all t and
3. eW =
R
ei;tdi for all t.
Condition 2 states that average TFP in the world is consistent with individual countries'
TFP choices. Condition 3 ensures that there is market clearing in the market for high-skilled
labor.
3.5 Initial characterization of a country's investment decision
In the model, it is assumed that there are perfect world capital markets. This implies that the
interest rates pt=pt+1 are exogenous from the point of view of an individual country. Given
this assumption, each planner's utility maximization problem can be separated into two
independent problems: an income-maximization problem, and an intertemporal consumption
allocation problem. We state each of them in turn.
In the income-maximization problem, the country planner chooses a sequence of future























t=0, as given. The expression
in (7) is obtained by inserting the expression for ei;t from (4) into (1) . The term wteW can
be dropped since it is constant from the individual country's point of view.
Next, we turn to the intertemporal consumption allocation problem. Given sequences of
prices and country income, fpt;Yi;tg
1
t=0, the household in country i chooses its intertemporal






















In a world equilibrium, country and world consumption growth between t and t + 1 equals
(pt=pt+1). Using the separation of the optimization problem, the world equilibrium can
thus be redened as follows.
A world equilibrium thus consists of sequences of allocations fTi;t;Ci;t;ei;tg
1

























ei;tdi for all t;
4. fCi;tg
1











pt+1 for all i;t.
In Section 5, the world equilibrium will also be dened recursively, for the special case of a
distribution consisting of two groups of countries.
4 Balanced growth equilibria
This analysis will focus on the long-run world distributions of TFP. Therefore, we restrict
our attention to balanced growth equilibria. A balanced growth equilibrium is a world
equilibrium, as dened in Section 3.5, in which all variables grow at constant rates. There
is a common world growth rate g of  Tt, Ti;t,Ci;t and wt. The common growth rate allows us















Before dening the balanced growth equilibrium, we restate the optimization problem in












Using (9) and the variables thus dened, the country planner's income-maximization problem
in a balanced growth equilibrium can be stated as follows. The country planner chooses a


















taking ^ w and g as given.
The solution to the optimization problem above results in the following Euler equation


















As can be seen from (11), there are three eects of an increase in the relative TFP level on
income. First, there is an increase in investment costs at time t, as captured by the term
on the left-hand side. Second, there is a increase in output at time t + 1, corresponding
to the rst term on the right-hand side. Third, there is a decrease in investment costs at
time t + 1, as given by the second term on the right-hand side. The last eect depends
directly on . For low values of , a large part of the dynamic gains to TFP are country-
specic, and investment in TFP today generates large decreases in future investment costs.
As  increases, the country-specic gains decrease, and catch-up with the frontier becomes
relatively more important.
4.1 Denition of a balanced growth equilibrium
Formally, a balanced growth equilibrium, a BGE, is a world equilibrium, as dened in Section
3.5, such that pt = 
t, ei;t = ei 8i;t and Ti;t = Ti(1 + g)t 8i;t for g > 0.
What is the distribution of countries over relative TFP levels in a balanced growth equi-
librium? Let this distribution be described by  (z), a probability measure on (S;s) where
S 2 [zmin;zmax] and s is the associated Borel -algebra. This measure will be discussed
further below. Using  (z), we can redene the balanced growth equilibrium in recursive
notation.
11A balanced growth equilibrium consists of a stationary probability measure  (z),
variables ^ w and g, and functions v(z) and E(z) such that
1. 8z, v(z) solves
v(z) = max
e














1+g H(E(z)))1= d (z) = 1;
4.
R






d (z) 8B 2 S:
The rst and second conditions give the value function and policy function, respectively.
The third condition states that the integral over all relative TFP levels must equal 1. The
fourth condition is the market-clearing condition for high-skilled workers. The last condition
ensures that the probability measure  (z) is stationary.  (z) is stationary if, for each set
B 2 S, the distribution of countries over relative TFP levels is time-invariant.
The astute reader has noticed that the consumption allocation is absent from the deni-
tion of the balanced growth equilibrium above. The reason is twofold. First, the relationship
between consumption growth and prices, as specied in (9), is already embedded in the de-
nition of v(z). Second, given the assumption of perfect capital markets, the distribution
of consumption across countries is independent of the relative TFP levels z. In a balanced
growth equilibrium, the level of consumption for a country is given by the consumer's in-
tertemporal consumption allocation problem. Although consumption growth is identical in
all countries, the level of consumption in a given country depends on initial conditions.
An obvious candidate for a balanced growth equilibrium is one in which all countries
behave identically: a symmetric one. In a symmetric BGE, or SBGE, the measure  (z) is
degenerate with all its mass at z = 1. For any other shape of  (z) it must be the case that
the function E(z) implies multiple stationary points.1 We will discuss the dierent possible
outcomes in turn, starting with the SBGE.
1A stationary point is a stationary solution to (10), or in recursive terms; z = z1  H(E(z))
1+g .
125 Symmetric balanced growth equilibria
A candidate for an SBGE has the following two characteristics. First, all countries choose a
level of employment of high-skilled labor equal to the world average, eW. Second, the world
distribution of country relative TFP levels,  (z), is degenerate at zi = 1 for all i, thus it is
trivially unimodal.
In an SBGE, the world growth rate g is determined by (10), which evaluated in zt+1 =
zt = 1 gives
g = H(eW)   1:
Is this allocation optimal for each country? The TFP-adjusted wage rate for high-skilled
workers, ^ w, will be such that the rst-order condition from the country planner's optimization
problem is satised. Therefore, the Euler equation, (11), gives the wage rate as
^ w =
H0(eW)
(1 + g)(1    (1   ))
:
As a result of the symmetry across countries, both g and ^ w are determined by eW, the average
number of high-skilled workers in the world. In addition, ^ w is decreasing in  whereas g is
independent of .
Through the determination of the wage rate, the necessary condition for optimality is
thus satised. However, the rst-order condition is not automatically sucient, as the ob-
jective function is not necessarily concave. In fact, the concavity of the objective function is
determined by the parameter . We resort to numerical solutions for v(z) and E(z) which
show that below a threshold level of , the second-order conditions for optimality are not
satised at z = 1 and an SBGE does not exist. The following sections contain this analysis.
In Section 5.3, we then consider stability analysis and transitional dynamics.
5.1 A numerical example
To illustrate the characteristics of the balanced growth equilibrium, we provide a numerical
example. The parameter values have been set as follows. The parameter b, which governs
the upper bound of the TFP production function function, is set to 4:5. , which governs the
concavity of the function, is set to 0:4. The consumers' discount factor, , equals 0:9. The
total number of high-skilled workers in the world, eW, is set to 0:1. Finally, the parameter
governing the weight of frontier countries' TFP in average TFP,  , is set to 1 which implies
that  T is an arithmetic average of all Ti; we briey discuss the eects of varying   in Section
6. Note that at this stage, the parameter values are not chosen to match real-world data.
5.2 Existence in an SBGE: a country's policy function
Using the numerical example described above, we calculate an individual country planner's
optimal policy function zt+1 = f(zt). Figures 1-4 below show the properties of the policy
13function for dierent values of , under the assumption that all other countries are in a
symmetric balanced growth equilibrium.2 The stationary points depicted are those for which
sucient conditions for optimality are satised.
Figure 1 depicts the case when  is high, i.e., when technological catch-up is important
for TFP growth. The policy function has a unique stationary point which is the symmetric
equilibrium z = 1.





As  decreases, the policy function starts to bend downward to the left of z = 1 and
upward to the right of z = 1. This case is shown in Figure 2.





Figure 3 illustrates that as  decreases further, two new stationary points emerge, one
2We obtained the policy functions through value function iteration. Figures 1-4 are stylized descriptions
of the properties of the functions.
14on each side of z = 1. The stationary point z = 1 itself now becomes unstable, a result that
will be discussed in the stability analysis below.





Finally, as depicted in Figure 4, for suciently low values of , the symmetric stationary
point ceases to exist, while the two asymmetric points remain, albeit further apart.





A more detailed account of how existence of the SBGE depends on  in our numerical
example is given in Table 1 below.
5.3 Stability and transitional dynamics
The previous section showed that for high values of , an SBGE exists. The one-group
model does not exhibit any transitional dynamics around this SBGE. That is, if the initial
distribution of relative TFP levels, zi;0, is identical for all countries i, then all countries will
15choose the same investment in TFP in the initial period, eW, and the resulting growth rate
will be identical to that of the SBGE, g, from the beginning of time. If all countries start in
a symmetric equilibrium, the consumption levels of all countries are identical in all periods.
If a country starts with an initial level z0 higher (lower) than 1, it will have a higher (lower)
level of consumption in every period than a country with z0 = 1.3 Next, we want to ascertain
whether the symmetric equilibrium is stable.
There are several kinds of perturbations of countries, or groups of countries, with respect
to which the equilibrium could be stable (or unstable). First, one can determine the stability
with respect to a perturbation of one single country. Thus, one country is given a relative
TFP level z that is slightly dierent from z = 1, while the rest are at z = 1. What path
will that country then follow? If, and only if, it converges back to z = 1, then the SBGE
is stable with respect to perturbations of a single country. In addition, one can determine
stability with respect to perturbations of groups of countries, where the groups could be of
any size. Now, suppose countries are divided into n groups, of arbitrary size; within a group,
all countries have the same level of z. Suppose that all groups are given initial relative TFP
levels z that are slightly dierent from z = 1. If all groups converge back to z = 1, then
the SBGE is stable with respect to perturbations of groups of countries. In this analysis, we
will determine the stability of the equilibrium with respect to two kinds of perturbations;
to a perturbation of one country, which we denote measure-zero stability, and to a 2-group
perturbation, denoted 2-group stability.
In order to perform the stability analysis, we dene a 2-group recursive world equilib-
rium in which transitions are possible, i.e., where the equilibrium does not have to exhibit
balanced growth. This denition will also be the point of departure for a characterization of
asymmetric balanced growth equilibria, which are discussed the next section.
Let the two groups have relative TFP levels z1 and z2. Within a group, all countries are
identical. As in the numerical example,   is set to 1, which implies that  Tt is an arithmetic
average of all Ti;t. Let ' be the share of countries belonging to group 1, which we denote
the low-TFP group. The group with relative TFP level z2 is denoted the high-TFP group.
The sum of relative TFP levels must equal 1, which implies that z2 =
1 'z1
1 ' . Consequently,
the programming problem can be dened using only one aggregate state variable; z1. A
recursive 2-group world equilibrium can be dened as follows.
A recursive 2-group world equilibrium consists of v(z;z1), E(z;z1), w(z1), f(z1), and
g(z1) such that (subscripts i omitted for convenience)
1. 8(z;z1), v(z;z1) solves
v(z;z1) = max








3If a nontrivial distribution of initial asset positions is allowed, that will also inuence the level of con-
sumption.
162. 8(z;z1), E(z;z1) is
E(z;z1) = argmax
e v(z;z1);





4. 8z1, f(z1) = 'z
1 





















The rst and second conditions give the value function and the policy function, respec-
tively, for a country which faces an aggregate relative TFP level z1 and chooses its individual
relative TFP level z. The third condition states the law of motion for the aggregate state
variable z1. The function f(z1) determines the gross aggregate growth rate 1 + gt. The last
condition is the market-clearing condition for high-skilled workers.
5.3.1 Measure-zero stability
To determine whether the symmetric equilibrium is stable with respect to measure-zero
perturbations, we analyze the behavior of an individual country whose relative TFP level
diers slightly from the symmetric steady state value, z = 1. Using the notation introduced






Measure-zero stability can then be established based on the derivative of (13):
@z0
@z







where E1(z;z1) is the derivative of the policy function E(z;z1) with respect to its rst
argument. It is possible to deduce E1(z;z1) from the recursive version of the Euler equation,
(11). By taking the derivative with respect to z, one obtains a second-order equation in
E1(z;z1). The two solutions for E1(z;z1) result in a pair of expressions for @z0
@z . Saddle-path
stability corresponds to one expression larger than 1 in absolute value and one expression less








Here, we see that the stability properties of the SBGE will depend heavily on .
17Equivalently, linearization of (11) around z = 1 yields the characteristic equation
x










(1   (1   ))G(1)




  (1   ): (17)
The roots to the equation in (16) determine the stability of the system with respect to
measure-zero perturbations around the value z = 1. The product of the roots is equal to
1=, which implies that at least one of the roots is larger than 1. Again, as seen from (17)
the values of the roots depend on . We show, using our numerical example, that for high
values of , one root is less than 1 in absolute value and one root larger than 1. Hence, the
SBGE is saddle-path stable. This is the case depicted in Figures 1 and 2. For intermediate
values of , both roots are larger than 1 in absolute value and, consequently, the SBGE is
unstable. Figure 3 corresponds to this case. Any country with a relative TFP level smaller
than z = 1 will converge to the stationary point to the left of z = 1 and any country with
a relative TFP level larger than z = 1 will converge to the stationary point to the right of
z = 1. For low values of , the roots are complex, which contradicts optimality and there
is no SBGE, as shown in Figure 4. Hence, for values of  below some threshold, a country
whose initial level of TFP is slightly dierent from z = 1 will not converge to the SBGE.
The measure-zero stability of the numerically calculated examples is listed in Table 1 below.
The stability analysis established that for some values of , a single country perturbed
away from the SBGE will not converge to it. The next step is to determine to what relative
TFP level the country will converge. In terms of gures 1-4, these levels correspond to the
stationary points other than z = 1 appearing in some cases. For this purpose, we examine




H0(H 1 (z(1 + g)))
: (18)
First, note that this equation is satised for z = 1, the symmetric BGE. Moreover, both the
left-hand side and the right-hand side of the equation are increasing in z, indicating that
the equation can have multiple solutions. In our numerical example, we found that when 
is low, there are at least two additional solutions to (18). This case is depicted in Figures 3
and 4.
Why do the asymmetric stationary points arise? The model exhibits two countervailing
forces; the catch-up eect, which generates convergence, and the dynamic increasing returns,
18which generates divergence. When technological catch-up is less important, i.e.,  is low, the
divergence eect dominates. Countries with a higher relative TFP level will nd it optimal
to invest more in TFP than countries with a lower relative TFP level.
5.3.2 2-group stability
In this section, we examine whether the SBGE is stable with respect to 2-group perturbations.
As in the denition above, all countries are divided into two groups, denoted by their relative
TFP levels: z1 and z2. The SBGE is stable if a group of countries, when given initial values
of z slightly dierent from 1, converges back to the SBGE. Suppose that group 1 is given
a TFP level slightly dierent from z1 = 1. Whether the countries in group 1 will converge
back to z1 = 1 is determined by g(z1). The derivative of g(z1) is
g















which, evaluated at z1 = 1, f(z1) = H(eW), and E(z1;z1) = eW equals
g
0(1) = 1    +
H0(eW)
H(eW)




In Appendix 1, we show that both f0(1) and E2(1;1) are equal to zero. Hence, (20) is
identical to (15) and, consequently, the 2-group stability analysis yields conclusions identical
to those of the measure-zero stability analysis; for values of  below a certain threshold,
a group of countries whose initial levels of TFP are slightly dierent from z = 1 will not
converge to the SBGE. The 2-group stability of the numerically calculated examples is shown
in Table 1.
Table 1: SBGE for an example economy
 existence ^ w g e measure-zero stability 2-group stability
0.226 yes 6.18 1.34 0.1 stable stable
0.224 yes 6.22 1.34 0.1 stable stable
0.222 yes 6.25 1.34 0.1 unstable unstable
0.220 yes 6.29 1.34 0.1 unstable unstable
0.218 yes 6.33 1.34 0.1 unstable unstable
0.216 yes 6.37 1.34 0.1 unstable unstable
0.214 no | | | | |
Explanatory notes:
^ w: TFP-adjusted wage rate
g: TFP growth rate
e: amount of high-skilled workers employed
measure-zero stability: stability with respect to single-country perturbations
2-group stability: stability with respect to two-group perturbations
19The table shows computed SBGE for values of  ranging from 0:216 to 0:226. The
growth rate g is equal to 1:34 for all symmetric BGE since it is independent of . This
rate is very high, but is a result of the choice of parameter values for the function H(e).
The TFP-adjusted wage rate ^ w is decreasing in . Symmetry across countries implies that
the amount of high-skilled labor employed in TFP accumulation is 0:1 , which is equal to
the average amount of high-skilled workers in the world. The two last columns in Table 1
indicate whether the equilibrium is stable or not. For  = 0:224 or higher, the equilibrium
is stable. However, as  decreases, it becomes unstable, and nally, for  = 0:214 or lower,
the equilibrium ceases to exist.
6 Asymmetric balanced growth equilibria
An asymmetric balanced growth equilibrium, an ABGE, is one in which all variables grow
at constant rates and there is more than one level of relative TFP chosen by the country
planners. We will focus on a particular type of ABGE, namely 2-group BGE. These are
\natural" outcomes (as opposed to outcomes with more than two groups), as will be argued
below.
6.1 2-group balanced growth equilibria
The 2-group BGE is a specic case of the 2-group world equilibrium dened in Section 5,
in which the growth rate is constant: Ti;t = Ti(1 + g)t 8i;t for g > 0. Since there are no
transitional dynamics by denition in a BGE, we can omit the aggregate state variable z1
from the optimization problem.
A recursive 2-group balanced growth equilibrium consists of v(z), E(z), w(z1),
f(z1), and g(z1) such that
1. 8z, v(z) solves
v(z) = max







2. 8z, E(z) is
E(z) = argmax
e v(z);





4. 8z1, f(z1) = 'z
1 





















The rst and second conditions give the value function and the policy function, respec-
tively. The third condition ensures that the 2-group distribution is stationary. The function
f(z1) determines the constant gross aggregate growth rate 1 + g. In the ABGE, the world
growth rate is determined by the division of high-skilled labor into the low- and high-TFP
groups, and the relative size of the two groups. In addition, it depends on , whereas the
growth rate in the SBGE is independent of . The last condition is the market-clearing
condition for high-skilled workers.
Let e1 and e2 be the amount of high-skilled labor employed in the low-TFP group and
the high-TFP group, respectively. The unknown parameters e1, e2, and ' are determined








with the market-clearing condition for high-skilled labor ( condition 5 in (21)). This system of
two equations is underdetermined; it has one more unknown than equations. Consequently,
if one solution exists, there are innitely many solutions, indeed a whole continuum. Each
solution has a corresponding distinct world growth rate, and TFP-adjusted wage rate for
high-skilled labor.
Equation (22) allows us to identify a key necessary condition for a 2-group ABGE to
exist: what is required is non-monotonicity of H(e)
1 
 H0(e). Whether or not there is non-
monotonicity depends on the primitives  and H(e). Since H is increasing and strictly
concave, there are opposing forces, as a straightforward derivative of this expression reveals.
We do not attempt to provide general conditions on H and  that satisfy the necessary non-
monotonicity here; for the specic functional form for H we consider in this paper, however,
non-monotonicity is satised in a range (0;  ), with   < 1.
Also, note that for ABGEs with more than 2 groups, when there is non-monotonicity,
for a generic e, there is an odd number of solutions to (22). Here, stability arguments (like
those discussed in Section 5.3) make us focus on 2 (as opposed to 3) groups. We have not
fully analyzed the case where (22) would admit more than 3 (say, 5) solutions, but such a
possibility does at least not seem feasible with the functional form for H used here.
In an ABGE, the ratio of TFP between the low-and high-TFP group,
T1














(1 + g)(1   (1   ))
; (23)
where i 2 f1;2g.
The assumption of free movement of high-skilled labor across countries ensures that
the wage rate paid to high-skilled workers is identical in the two groups. Therefore, the
TFP-adjusted wage rate can be obtained from the Euler equation for either group. In the
asymmetric equilibrium, the wage rate depends on the relative TFP levels as well as the
division of high-skilled labor across the two groups.
As in the symmetric one, the asymmetric equilibrium has consumption growth that is
identical for both groups and thus for all countries, but the level of consumption in a given
country depends on its total income and on initial conditions. All countries in the low-TFP
group will have a lower total income, and hence a lower level of consumption than countries
in the high-TFP group. If all countries start in the asymmetric equilibrium, countries within
the same group will have identical consumption levels.
6.2 Numerical example
The numerical example presented in Section 5.1 can be used to characterize the 2-group
asymmetric equilibria as well as the symmetric ones. Table 2 below shows the computed
symmetric and asymmetric balanced growth equilibria for dierent values of .
Table 2: Balanced growth equilibria for an example economy
SBGE Range of ABGE
 stability g gap ^ w g '
0.226 stable 1.34 | | | |
0.220 unstable 1.34 0.190-0.195 6.289-6.161 1.342-1.342 0.151-0.598
0.214 | | 0.093-0.097 6.400-6.047 1.346-1.345 0.325-0.732
0.208 | | 0.052-0.055 6.510-5.868 1.353-1.350 0.428-0.800
0.202 | | 0.031-0.033 6.614-5.632 1.363-1.356 0.502-0.844
0.196 | | 0.019-0.021 6.709-5.351 1.375-1.363 0.560-0.876
Explanatory notes:
g: TFP growth rate
gap: ratio of TFP between low- and high-TFP group
^ w: TFP-adjusted wage rate
': share of countries in low-TFP group
Table 2 displays, for each value of , the characteristics of the symmetric and asymmetric
BGE. For the symmetric BGE, it shows whether the equilibrium is stable along with its
growth rate g. For the asymmetric BGE, it shows the resulting values for the \gap", i.e., the
ratio of TFP between the low-and high-TFP group, as well as ^ w, g, and '. The indeterminacy
of the system of equations in the 2-group BGE implies that the numerical solutions entail
22ranges of values for the parameters. The table shows that for values of  of 0.226 or higher,
only the symmetric BGE exists, and it is stable. For  equal to 0.220, the symmetric BGE
is unstable, and a there exists a continuum of asymmetric BGE.4 As  decreases to 0.214
or less, the symmetric BGE ceases to exist, while the asymmetric BGE remain. Within the
group of ABGE, the table shows that the growth rate g decreases in .
From Table 2 we can conclude that if technological catch-up is important for TFP growth,
i.e.,  is high, the distribution of TFP is symmetric. If, instead, technological catch-up is less
important, i.e.,  is low, the distribution of TFP is asymmetric: twin-peaked. As mentioned
above, the intuition for the rise of asymmetric BGE is that for suciently low values of
, the dynamic increasing returns eect (which creates divergence) dominates the catch-up
eect (which creates convergence). This implies that countries with a higher relative TFP
level will nd it optimal to invest more in TFP than countries with a lower relative TFP
level. The former are technological leaders while the latter are technological laggards that
benet from technology spillovers from the leaders. If the countries have dierent initial
TFP levels, then countries with lower initial relative TFP will invest less, such that they
eventually reach z1, which constitutes the low-TFP group of the ABGE. Similarly, countries
with higher initial relative TFP will invest more, such that they eventually reach z2, which
constitutes the high-TFP group.5
Let us return to the parameterization of  , which governs the weight of frontier countries'
TFP in the world average TFP level. In our numerical example,   = 1 and  T is an arithmetic
average of all Ti. It is conceivable that frontier countries' TFP could have a larger weight in
world average TFP, which would correspond to   > 1. How would that aect the equilibria
of the model? In an SBGE, all countries have identical TFP levels, and the value of   has
no eect on the average world TFP. In an ABGE, countries' relative TFP levels dier, and
  does aect the world average TFP,  T, and its rate of growth, g. An increase in   increases
g which, in turn, decreases ^ w as seen in (23). However, an individual country takes  T as
given and therefore   does not aect the country's optimal choice of e, the amount of skilled
workers to employ. The system of equations determining the 2-group ABGE, given by (22)
and condition 5 in (21), is unaected by   and so are the range of ABGE calculated in our
numerical example. Since an increase in   aects g and ^ w it also aects the out-of-steady-
state dynamics, but we have not analyzed this eect in any more detail.
4For a small range of values for , symmetric and asymmetric BGE coexist. Within that range, as 
decreases, the symmetric BGE goes from being stable to unstable.
5If all countries start at the same initial TFP level, our conjecture is that they will split up into two
groups, one which starts to invest less, such that it eventually reaches z1, and one which starts to invest
more, such that it eventually reaches z2. In the initial period, the sequence of wages and relative TFP levels,
fwt;ztg
1
t=0, must be such that the countries are indierent between joining the low- and the high-TFP
groups, and that they choose to split up into groups of relative size which is consistent with the ABGE.
236.3 Stability properties of the ABGE
To ascertain whether the asymmetric balanced growth equilibria are stable, we perform the
same type of stability analyses as for the symmetric balanced growth equilibria: measure-zero
stability and 2-group stability.
6.3.1 Measure-zero stability
An ABGE characterized by the triplet e1, e2, and ' is stable with respect to measure-zero
perturbations if a single country, which is given an initial relative TFP level slightly dierent
from z1, converges back to z1, and a single country perturbed away from z2 converges back
to z2. Whether the country converges back or not is determined by @z0
@z , as given by (14),
evaluated at z = z1 and z = z2, respectively. As in the case of the measure-zero stability
analysis of the SBGE, the derivative of the recursive version of (11) with respect to z gives
a second-order equation in E1(z;z1) which results in a pair of expressions for @z0
@z . This pair
is then evaluated at both z1 and z2. We compute measure-zero stability for the ABGE in
the numerical example characterized above, and Table 3 below displays the results.
6.3.2 2-group stability
An ABGE characterized by the triplet e1, e2, and ' is stable with respect to 2-group pertur-
bations if the following holds: when the low-TFP group is given an initial relative TFP level
slightly dierent from z1, it converges back to z1. (Since a perturbation of one group aects
the remaining group, it is sucient to analyze perturbations of one group only.) Suppose
that the low-TFP group is perturbed away from z1. Whether it will converge back to z1 is
determined by the derivative of g(z1), as given by (19).
Unlike the in SBGE, the derivatives f0(z1) and E2(z1;z1) are not equal to zero, and must
therefore be solved for in order to evaluate g0(z1). To that end, we compute the derivative
with respect to z1 of the recursive version of (11), and evaluate it at z = z1 and z = z2,
respectively. Combining the resulting two equations with the expressions for f0(z1), g0(z1),
and the derivative with respect to z1 of condition 5 in (12), we obtain a system of 5 equations.
There are ve unknowns; f0(z1), g0(z1), E2(z1;z1), E2(z2;z1), and w0(z1). The system yields
a second-order equation in E2(z1;z1) and therefore has two solutions. We solve the system of
equations, and for each solution obtain an expression for g0(z1); see Appendix 1 for details.
If one of the expressions is larger than 1 in absolute value, and one is less than 1 in absolute
value, there is saddle-path stability. We compute the values of g0(z1) for the ABGE in the
numerical example characterized above, and the results are reported in Table 3.
24Table 3: Range of ABGE for an example economy
 gap ^ w g ' measure-zero stability 2-group stability
0.220 0.190-0.195 6.289-6.161 1.342-1.342 0.151-0.598 stable stable
0.214 0.093-0.097 6.400-6.047 1.346-1.345 0.325-0.732 stable stable
0.208 0.052-0.055 6.510-5.868 1.353-1.350 0.428-0.800 stable stable
0.202 0.031-0.033 6.614-5.632 1.363-1.356 0.501-0.844 stable stable
0.196 0.019-0.021 6.709-5.351 1.376-1.363 0.560-0.876 stable stable
Explanatory notes:
gap: ratio of TFP between low- and high-TFP group
^ w: TFP-adjusted wage rate
g: TFP growth rate
': share of countries in low-TFP group
measure-zero stability: stability with respect to single-country perturbations
2-group stability: stability with respect to 2-group perturbations
As Table 3 shows, the ABGE in the numerical example are stable, both with respect to
measure-zero and to 2-group perturbations.
7 TFP shocks
In this section, the model is extended to allow for country-specic shocks to TFP. The
motivation for this extension is twofold. First, it is to create a more smooth and realistic
world TFP distribution where individual countries can move between groups and potentially
experience both growth miracles and growth disasters. Second, it is an attempt to eliminate
the indeterminacy of the asymmetric steady states obtained in the baseline model.
7.1 Model
The following assumptions are added to the model described in Section 3. Each country is
subject to a TFP shock "i;t, " 2 f"L;"Hg where "L < "H. The probability of a good shock
is denoted P("H) = . The shock " is iid across countries and across time. The country
planner sets ei;t before observing the shock "i;t. With TFP shocks, the accumulation of TFP
has the following form





which is (4) with the addition of the shock "i;t.
It is also assumed that the world has perfect consumption insurance and frictionless
borrowing and lending. This ensures that a separation of the optimization problem into
an income-maximization problem and an intertemporal consumption allocation problem is
still valid. The intertemporal consumption allocation problem is the same as the one in the
model without technology shocks, and the resulting allocation will be the same, given total
income. However, the income-maximization problem is dierent, as will be described below.
257.2 A country's investment decision
As in the model without shocks, we restrict our attention to balanced growth equilibria. In
the income-maximization problem, the country planner chooses an investment in TFP so as
to maximize output net of investment costs. The recursive formulation of the optimization
problem is
v(z) = max
e z   ^ we + (v(z
0
H) + (1   )v(z
0
L))







The country planner employs an amount e of high-skilled workers in a given time period.
With probability  the country is hit by a positive shock, and the resulting next period
relative TFP level is z0
H and the corresponding value function is v(z0
H). With probability
1  the country is hit by a negative shock, and the resulting next period relative TFP level
is z0
L, associated with the value function v(z0
L).
7.3 Denition of a balanced growth equilibrium
A balanced growth equilibrium is a world equilibrium, where all variables grow at rate g
on average. Individual countries can have a TFP growth that is faster or slower than this
average rate g. The distribution of z is constant. As in the model without shocks, let  (z)
be a probability measure on (S;s) where S 2 [zmin;zmax] and s is the associated Borel
-algebra.   is set to 1, which implies that  T is an arithmetic average of all Ti.6
A balanced growth equilibrium consists of a stationary probability measure  (z),
variables ^ w and g, and functions v(z) and E(z) such that
1. 8z, v(z) solves
v(z) = max
e

















2. 8z, E(z) is
E(z) = argmax
e v(z);
6Readers familiar with the contributions of Bewley (undated), Huggett (1993), and Aiyagari (1994) will
recognize a similarity of the steady-state analyses of consumer inequality there with the balanced growth
equilibrium with country inequality here. A technical dierence between these is that there are two unknown
long-run quantities here|the real wage and the endogenous growth rate|as opposed to only one|the real















4. ^ w solves
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d (z) 8B 2 S:(24)
The rst and second conditions give the value function and policy function, respectively.
The third condition states that the growth rate g must be such that the integral over all
relative TFP levels equals 1. The fourth condition states that the wage ^ w must be such that
there is market clearing in the market for high-skilled workers. The last condition ensures
that the probability measure  (z) is stationary.
7.4 A numerical example
The model with TFP shocks is solved numerically using the parameterization in the example
applied to the baseline model. There are three additional parameters values to be set; ,
"L, and "H.  is set to 0.5, implying that the TFP shock is high and low with equal
probability. The size of the shock is chosen such that the shock is symmetric; "L =  0:05
and "H = 0:05. Numerical solutions are then obtained for dierent values of ; the solution
method is described in Appendix A2. Figures 5-7 below depict the world distribution of
relative TFP levels zi corresponding to =0.24, 0.225, and 0.22, respectively. From the
results obtained in this numerical example, the equilibrium appears to be unique for a given
value of .
27Figure 5 shows the world distribution of zi for =0.24. The distribution is single-peaked.
As a result of the TFP shocks, there is signicant dispersion around the center value z = 1,
creating the smooth symmetric shape of the distribution.
Figure 5:  = 0:24
When  is decreased to 0.225, as displayed in Figure 6, the distribution is still single-
peaked but the dispersion has increased, some countries lag behind, while others are at much
higher relative TFP levels.
Figure 6:  = 0:225
Figure 7 shows that for  as low as 0.22, the distribution of TFP is asymmetric; it is
twin-peaked. One group of countries has settled at a low TFP level, and another at a high
TFP level. As countries are hit by shocks, it is possible for a given country to move from one
of the groups to the other. However, the distribution of countries over TFP levels remains
constant. We can conclude that for high values of , the distribution is single-peaked, while
for suciently low values of  the distribution of countries is twin-peaked.
28Figure 7:  = 0:22
Even though an individual country's TFP grows at rate g on average, its consumption
grows at rate g for all t. The relative levels of consumption are determined by initial con-
ditions. All countries which start at the same initial relative TFP level z0 have the same
consumption level. A country which starts at a higher (lower) initial level has a higher
(lower) level of consumption in each time period.
How do the results from the model with TFP shocks compare to the model without
shocks? The numerical results show that with shocks, the balanced growth equilibrium
appears to be unique for a given value of , whereas without shocks, the model produced
a continuum of asymmetric equilibria. However, the main results from the baseline model
remain; if technological catch-up is important for TFP growth, ( is high), the distribution
of TFP is symmetric. If, instead, technological catch-up is less important, ( is low), the
distribution of TFP is asymmetric: twin-peaked.
8 Changes in the distribution of world TFP
The distribution of world TFP is not constant over time. Three snapshots of the distribution
of labor productivity, measured as log (PPP-adjusted) output per worker, from Acemoglu
(2009) are depicted in Figure 8 below.7
7The distributions are based on kernel density estimates.
29Figure 8: Distributions of world labor productivity (from Acemoglu, 2009)
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Figure 1.4. Estimates of the distribution of countries according to log GDP
per worker (PPP-adjusted) in 1960, 1980 and 2000.
also that these numbers refer to PPP-adjusted quantities, thus diﬀerences in consumption do
not (at least in principle) reﬂect the fact that the same bundle of consumption goods costs
diﬀerent amounts in diﬀerent countries. The PPP adjustment corrects for these diﬀerences
and attempts to measure the variation in real consumption. Therefore, the richest countries
are not only producing more than thirty times as much as the poorest countries, but are
also consuming thirty times as much. Similarly, cross-country diﬀerences in health are quite
remarkable; while life expectancy at birth is as high as 80 in the richest countries, it is only
between 40 and 50 in many sub-Saharan African nations. These gaps represent huge welfare
diﬀerences.
Understanding how some countries can be so rich while some others are so poor is one
of the most important, perhaps the most important, challenges facing social science. It
is important both because these income diﬀerences have major welfare consequences and
because a study of these striking diﬀerences will shed light on how the economies of diﬀerent
nations function and sometimes how they fail to function.
The emphasis on income diﬀerences across countries implies neither that income per
capita can be used as a “suﬃcient statistic” for the welfare of the average citizen nor that it
is the only feature that we should care about. As we will discuss in detail later, the eﬃciency
properties of the market economy (such as the celebrated First Welfare Theorem or Adam
7
We observed marked twin peaks in 1980 and more dispersion in 2000, though here the
peak on the left is less clear, whereas the 1960 distribution shows only weak signs of bi-
modality. Whether there are two peaks or not, these distributions are dierent, and the
general question we ask here is what fundamental determinants lie behind the shape of the
distribution of TFP generated by our model. We will, in turn, and very briey, discuss
some of the determinants: changes in , changes in trading costs for e, changes in H, and
transitional dynamics.8
8.1 The value of 
First, we saw above that  is a key determinant of whether bimodality is an outcome in our
model; low values are required, ceteris paribus, for bimodality, and generally speaking a lower
 tends to make the distribution more dispersed. Thus, a move toward bimodality/more
dispersion might be interpreted as a decrease in . What, then, is  exactly? We have
remained deliberately vague on this, and the Nelson-Phelps setting indeed is \ad hoc": it is
not derived from rst (technological) principles. As specied,  captures two features at once.
First, it captures something that we might label a technology (either physical technology or
information technology), i.e., how easily transferable TFP knowledge is from the world to a
given economy. With this interpretation, a fall in  means weaker transferability. Given the
rise of IT technology and, more generally, globalization, this interpretation would suggest
that  has risen, as opposed to fallen. The other feature  captures, however, is how much of
the TFP investments are internalized, as opposed to how much they are treated as exogenous.
Here, in contrast, at least to the extent that countries are able to better coordinate action
across countries, and perhaps also better internalize TFP externalities that occur within a
given country, one would argue that a fall in  over this period is a reasonable assumption.
A conclusion from this discussion is that one would, perhaps, want a model that goes beyond
8Other primitives, such as  and eW or the nature of the shocks to TFP, can also inuence TFP distrib-
utions, but we include no analysis of them here.
30the simple Nelson-Phelps formulation by making the distinction between transferability (a
technology/information concern) and the degree of internalization of the dynamics of TFP
(a concern about how well countries are able to do this locally and how well they are able
to coordinate between them).
8.2 Trading costs
Globalization was argued above to at least potentially be a determinant of . However,
since  also captures other important model features, a cleaner experiment is to consider a
decrease in the costs of trading. Our theory so far assumes that e is an input that is traded
in world markets at a competitively determined price. Consider instead the polar opposite
case, namely that where e cannot be traded at all. Thus, with symmetric endowments, all






















since  T grows at rate H(eW). Thus, relative TFPs converge to one: there is global conver-
gence. More generally, based on the comparison of the extreme cases, with trade costs in
the fundamental input into the accumulation of TFP, we would thus expect to see a force
toward convergence. A fall in trade costs would then produce a force away from convergence
and toward the bimodal distribution of world TFP.
8.3 Other model parameters and transitional dynamics
We saw in Section 6.1 that the function H, which translates TFP investment input, e, into
TFP growth, is an important determinant behind the distribution of world TFP; recall, e.g.,
that a necessary condition for bimodality in an ABGE based on interior solutions is that
H(e)

1 H0(e) be non-monotonic. First, notice that if H is at, i.e., H(e) does not depend on
e, asymmetric outcomes are never possible. Thus, if \R&D has become more productive",
perhaps due to basic exogenous technical change, we would see a force toward bimodality.
The shape of H would matter too, and using our functional form for H, it appears that
higher curvature, i.e., more rapidly decreasing returns, also is a force toward bimodality.
Finally, transitional dynamics can of course explain changes in the TPF distribution.
That is, suppose that there are no changes in primitives but that these primitives imply a
bimodal long-run outcome, and suppose that the initial TFP distribution is a unimodal one
with less inequality in TFP than observed currently. Then we would see something like the
observed changes play out over time. However, this requires additional understanding of the
origins of the initial distribution. These origins, in turn, are likely due to technology, or
31information, or \country organization" being dierent in the present than the past. Again
take the trade costs as an example: if no trade is possible, we would see an outcome of equal
TFP in all countries, and if trade were made possible, there would then be gradual movement
from an equal to an unequal TFP distribution. A similar history would likely be generated
if TFP shocks were very minor in the past but have become signicant now, or if H was at
in the past (R&D was unproductive) but is upward-sloping in modern economies.9
9 Concluding comments
This paper tries to answer the question: if there is technological catch-up, as proposed
by Nelson and Phelps (1966), and each country takes this into account while maximizing
the utility of its citizens, what is the resulting equilibrium distribution of TFP? To this
end, the paper presents a general equilibrium model in which individual countries invest
in a technology-enhancing input that is traded in world markets, and the accumulation of
TFP is modeled according to the Nelson-Phelps specication. Even though all countries are
treated symmetrically, the model can generate a nontrivial long-run world distribution of
TFP. The model predicts that if technological catch-up is important for TFP growth, the
distribution of countries over relative TFP is symmetric. If, instead, technological catch-up
less important for TFP growth, the distribution is asymmetric: twin-peaked. There is one
group of countries with high TFP in relative terms, with the remainder of the countries
operating at a much lower relative TFP level. All countries grow at the same rate, but the
high-TFP countries invest more in technology than do low-TFP countries. The catch-up term
thus allows the low-TFP countries to grow at the same rate and not fall further behind in
relative terms. More generally, independently of whether bimodality is an important feature
of the data, the present model does produce equilibrium world distributions of TFP that
display more or less dispersion depending on the fundamental parameters of the model, and
the same parameters that tend to generate bimodality tend also to produce more dispersion.
The analysis we present is only a rst attempt at a theory of the world distribution of
country TFP. A serious quantitative analysis would require moving toward a model with
(i) capital accumulation; (ii) some extent of incomplete insurance against TFP shocks; and,
last but not least, (iii) geographical detail, so that large countries are dierent than small
countries (and, say, there is heterogeneity in s). Such extensions would be very interesting
to pursue in future work.
9Looking at a recent period, and based on a model similar in spirit to that in Greenwood and Yorukoglu
(1997), Beaudry, Collard and Green (2005) conclude that demographic change accounts for a large part of
the transitional changes in the distribution of world income. This is likely to be an important factor also in
an extended version of the present model.
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34Appendix A1
2-group stability of the SBGE
2-group stability is determined by
g















which evaluated at z1 = 1, f(z1) = H(eW), and E(z1;z1) = eW equals
g
0(1) = 1    +
H0(eW)
H(eW)




The derivative E2(1;1) can be obtained from the market-clearing condition for high-skilled
labor:







The derivative of this expression with respect to z1 is
@eW
@z1



















Evaluated at z1 = z2 = 1 and set to equal zero, this equation gives








'E1(1;1) + 'E2(1;1) + (1   ')E2(1;1)   'E1(1;1) = 0;
which implies that E2(1;1) = 0.
The derivative of f(z1) is
f
0(z1) = '(1   )z
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Using the previous result that E2(1;1) = 0, the expression reads
f
0(1) = 'H









Inserting E2(1;1) = 0 and f0(1) = 0 into g0(1) gives
g




which is equivalent to
@z0
@z




Hence, in the SBGE, 2-group stability is equivalent to measure-zero stability.


























Taking the rst-order condition gives
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where p and q are given above. This expression evaluated at z = z1 = 1 gives E1(1;1).
2-group stability of the ABGE
As in the case of the SBGE, 2-group stability is given by (25). In order to evaluate g0(z1)
in a given ABGE, the derivatives E1(z1;z1), E2(z1;z1), and f0(z1) must be computed. We
solve for E1(z1;z1) and E1(z2;z1) by evaluating (28) at z = 1 and z = 2, respectively. The
expression for E1(z1;z1) corresponding to the stable root is inserted into g0(z1). Inspection
of (26) reveals that when evaluated at z = z1 it does not imply that E2(z1;z1) = 0. Con-
sequently, f0(z1) is not zero, and both E2(z1;z1) and f0(z1) must be computed. In order to
solve for g0(z1), we construct the following system of equations. The rst two equations are
the derivative with respect to z1 of the recursive version of the Euler equation, (27), evalu-
ated at z = z1 and z = z2, respectively. The third equation states that
@eW
@z1 = 0. Combining
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37The system has ve unknown variables: f0(z1), g0(z1), E2(z1;z1), E2(z2;z1), and w0(z1).
This system yields a second-order equation in E2(z1;z1). Therefore, it has two solutions,
and two corresponding expressions for g0(z1). If, for a given triplet e1, e2, and ', one of the
expressions is larger than 1 in absolute value and the other one smaller than 1 in absolute
value, then the ABGE exhibits saddle-path stability.
Appendix A2
Solution method for the model with TFP shocks
The solution method used is similar to the one in Aiyagari (1994) albeit with two unknown
variables, g and ^ w. The value function is obtained using global search over a discrete grid.
Between grid points, the functions are interpolated with a cubic spline. The method involves
the following steps. Start with an initial guess for g and ^ w. Solve the dynamic programming
problem using the guess and obtain the policy function E(z). Simulate an individual coun-
try's choice of e and the resulting z for T time periods, where T is very large. Use the data
generated to check whether condition 4 in (24) is satised. If not, update the guess for ^ w
using the bisection method and repeat the procedure until condition 4 holds. Then, check
whether condition 3 in (24) is satised. If not, update the guess for g using the bisection
method. Given the new guess for g, nd the ^ w for which condition 4 is satised. Given this
combination of ^ w and g, check whether condition 3 holds. If not, update the guess for g.
Repeat the procedure until both conditions 3 and 4 in (24) are satised.
38